Between Negative Dialectics and Sexual difference: Generative Conjunctures in the Thinking of Gillian Howie by Hodge, J
3Between Negative Dialectics and Sexual 
Difference : Generative Conjunctures in the 
Thinking of Gillian Howie
Joanna Hodge
Introduction
Gillian Howie’s first monograph, Deleuze and Spinoza: Aura of Expressionism 
(2002), is controversial and contestatory.1 She is unconvinced by recent materi-
alist re-readings of Spinoza, and challenges the reading of Spinoza, inspired by 
Deleuze, as pursued variously by Rosi Braidotti and Moira Gatens, Paul Patton 
and John Protevi.2 Howie disagrees with those forms of feminist critique, which 
suppose that some combination of Spinozan, Nietzschean, or Deleuzian affir-
mations is a good route for feminist theorizing to follow today. Here is not the 
place to assess the detail of these disagreements, but they provide important 
points of reference for setting out the trajectory of her thinking. They also 
provide a context for the central intent of this chapter, which is to assess Howie’s 
surprising proposal instead to combine an enthusiasm for Adorno’s version of 
dialectics and for Irigaray’s interrogations of gender as an alternative route into 
recasting the connection between philosophy, feminist critique and political 
engagement. Irigaray’s interrogation of gender, in the form of a sexual difference, 
arrives in her claim: ‘Sexual difference is one of the questions, if not the question 
which is to be thought in our epoch.’ This claim arrives as the opening for her 
text, The Ethics of Sexual Difference, and it begs the questions: what is our epoch? 
1 Gillian Howie, Deleuze and Spinoza: Aura of Expressionism, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
2 See Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Theory: The Portable Rosi Braidotti, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2012; Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, Collective Imaginings: Spinoza Past and Present, 
London and New York: Routledge, 1999; Paul Patton, Deleuze and the Political, London: Routledge, 
1998; and John Protevi, Political Physics: Deleuze, Derrida and the Body Politics, London: 
Athlone, 2001.
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and what might the other questions be?3 It makes a connection back to Martin 
Heidegger, for whom the question of thinking the defining issue for an epoch 
remains a signature theme.
The proposed conjunction of Irigaray, on sexual difference and Adorno on 
dialectics, would thus seem to come immediately into difficulties, granted the 
oppositional stance of Adorno towards Martin Heidegger and all his works, 
and the oppositional stance of the feminist movement, at least in Germany, 
to Adorno’s mandarin masculinism. In this chapter, I propose to explore how 
these lines of conflict both provide Howie with a productive space for a wide-
ranging thinking, and reveal the nature of Howie’s ambitions for a contribution 
from philosophy, to contest how philosophy can engage with, and contribute 
to discussion of social and political process today. Howie’s view is that the 
combination of Adorno’s thoroughgoing challenge to Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology, with Irigaray’s identification of sexual difference as the defining issue 
for this epoch, can provide a philosophical conceptuality more adequate for 
analysis of current conditions and the connection between philosophy and 
politics, than that proposed in the names of Deleuze and Spinoza.
Deleuzian neo-materialism has itself over the past twenty years been exposed 
to, and challenged by, Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontologies, and by 
various versions of speculative realism, in the name of which yet another revival 
of political critique is surmised to be on the way.4 Howie develops her version 
of a connection between philosophy and political commitment in opposition to 
all these accounts. Her account draws rather on a critically inflected inheritance 
of the feminist and Marxist critiques of the 1980s, affirming a continuity with 
the projects of the Enlightenment, and of a universal emancipation, proposing 
a defence and elaboration of the ideals of reason and rights. In this context, 
theories of desire, associated with Freud and Lacan, have been conjoined to 
critiques of power in various combinations. These theories of desire have in turn 
been targeted by feminist critique, in general, in terms of a certain masculinist, 
or phallogocentric bias, and, more specifically, in terms of a Spinozan critique 
of the founding role in them of negation and disavowal, positing a primordial 
lack and experience of castration. Desire is thus to be emancipated from 
negation, and recast using components from the thinking of Marx, Foucault 
and Deleuze, in a general theory of energetics, forces and nerve systems. 
Howie resists such a line of argument, insisting with Adorno on a continuing 
3 Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. Carolyn Burke, London: Athlone, 1993, p. 5.
4 See Graham Harman, Tool Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects, New York: Open Court, 
2002; and Peter Gratton, Speculative Realism: Problems and Prospects, London: Bloomsbury, 2014.
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potential, and indeed necessity for thinking in terms of conceptions of negation 
and negativity, and affirming the powers of resistance contained within them. 
Critiques of power, associated with Marx and Engels, have also been put in 
question, both internally, with respect to Stalinist autocracy, and then exter-
nally, with respect to the failure of Soviet Communism. Louis Althusser, in his 
account of ideological state apparatuses, and Michel Foucault, on the enabling 
forces at work in power knowledge, provided analyses of the specific locations 
of discrete empowerments, ensuring some limited scope for effective interven-
tions, and thus permitting a work of analysis to proceed, if always in opposition 
to powerful contravening forces. The development of a bio-politics of resistance 
in the writings of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt do not come into Howie’s 
overview, but she is sceptical about the limitations imposed on critique and on 
the power of negation, under the rubric of bio-politics. For Howie, the analyses 
of Althusser continue to show how academic philosophy provides one such 
relatively protected stance from which the task of critique is the less obstructed 
by forces above and beyond the control of individual citizens. While receptive to 
the claims of disaggregated emancipatory critique, in the names variously of the 
subaltern, the postcolonial and of disability studies, Howie remains committed 
to a strong version of philosophical universality, both with respect to rights and 
with respect to conceptual scope.
In the closing page of this first monograph, Deleuze and Spinoza: Aura of 
Expressionism, Howie briefly invokes Adorno’s thinking as a resource for setting 
out an alternative route into materialism through a revival of his negative 
dialectics and of classical Marxist critique of ideology:
The task of criticising ideology, Adorno maintains, is to judge the subjective and 
the objective moments, and their dynamics. This returns to thought its three 
moments, the thought or judgement, the intentional object and the materiality 
of the object as well as returning to substance its content.5 
This is no more than a gesture, and it is regrettable that extended treatment 
of Adorno’s thinking, to demonstrate access to a materiality of its objects, 
remains lacking. In her second book, Between Feminism and Materialism: A 
Question of Method from 2010, Howie traces out how versions of feminist 
critique have sought to combine components from Freud and Marx, from 
Lacan and Althusser, and from Foucault and Barthes, to advance the cause of 
emancipation. In this context, the proposal to read Irigaray with Adorno, and 
5 Howie, Deleuze and Spinoza, p. 205.
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Adorno with Irigaray, is perhaps the less startling. These various conjunctures 
of a post-Freudian theory of desire, and of post-Stalinist critiques of power, 
proffer accounts of subjectivity, as subjectivation, and subjectification; and of 
matter, as consisting in productive potentialities rather than as a set of positive 
givens. These latter are shown by Adorno, and, with his assistance, by Howie, as 
constantly at risk of reification into a naturalized potestas (power as possession), 
commodity fetishism, and a reification of economic process, in finance capital. 
Reification and subjectivation are the danger; genealogies of concepts and 
critiques of patriarchal power the cure. But, for Howie, these always remain 
subordinated to the imperatives of reason, and to analysis in terms of rationally 
grounded principles of identity, as pre-conditions for the very possibility for 
thought and critique. She thus inserts her analyses into the cumulative reception 
of these conjunctures, opening herself up to all the problems arising from the 
attempt to survey a truly vast range of material.6
Howie’s two monographs, and the lines of enquiry subtended by them, 
thus arrive into a complicated, highly contested context, and they make a 
distinctive and unusual intervention. For while she insists on the claim of 
reason and argues for a priority of identity over difference, she is all the same 
focused on the processes whereby some are at ease, and some are set apart 
by current ways of thinking and of conceiving reason and identity. The title 
of her second monograph, Between Feminism and Materialism: A Question of 
Method,, itself makes clearer her angle of entry into this context of accumu-
lating differentiations, between ways of reading Spinoza, and between ways of 
reworking a relation between philosophical and political commitments. The 
task in the second monograph is framed as that of pursuing the accounts of 
their lived experience offered variously by Kate Millett and Virginia Woolf. 
They, like Howie, are alert to concerns and experiences which fail to register 
within a dominant delimitation of the tasks of philosophy, even when a 
commitment to politics, as an awareness of the continuing work of extracting 
surplus value, is to the fore. The citation from Virginia Woolf ’s A Room 
of One’s Own, placed at the head of the Acknowledgements to this second 
monograph, is instructive:
And I thought of all the women’s novels that lie scattered, like small pock 
marked apples in the orchard, about the second-hand book shops of London. 
6 There is some confirmation of her sense of a risk of losing something valuable in this work, in the 
current celebration of a new materialism, in the analysis offered in the Introduction to a recent 
collection New Materialisms. See Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (eds), New Materialisms: 
Ontology, Agency, and Politics, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010.
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It was the flaw at the centre that had rotted them. She had altered her values in 
deference to the opinion of others.7
The longer citation runs:
One has only to skim those old forgotten novels and listen to the tone of voice 
in which they are written to divine that the writer was meeting criticism; she 
was saying this by way of aggression, or that by way of conciliation. She was 
admitting that she was ‘only a woman’, or protesting that she was ‘as good as 
a man’. She met that criticism as her temperament dictated, with docility and 
diffidence, or with anger and emphasis. It does not matter which it was; she 
was thinking of something other than the thing itself. Down comes her book 
upon our heads. There was a flaw in the centre of it. And I thought of all the 
women’s novels that lie scattered, like small pock-marked apples in an orchard, 
about the second-hand book shops of London. It was the flaw in the centre 
that had rotted them. She had altered her values in deference to the opinion 
of others.
Remarkable here is Woolf ’s easy command of the move from the ‘I’ of 
experience, and authorial activity, to the ‘she’ of the condition of the writer, 
condemned to obscurity by neglect and marginalization, to loss of confidence 
and failure of nerve. I am put in mind of all the volumes entitled ‘Feminism and 
Philosophy’ which similarly adorn the shelves of second-hand book shops, and 
fail to feature on lists of introductions to philosophy.
The charge made by feminists who are not philosophers is just that: feminist 
philosophers have altered their values in deference to the opinions of their 
male colleagues and become both compromised and silenced. The groups 
addressed by Howie are then feminists within philosophy, and feminists outwith 
philosophy; philosophers with feminist commitments, and philosophers 
without feminist commitments; and a whole range of writers on philosophy, 
politics and the logics of exclusion who may not wish to align themselves 
with either philosophy, or feminism, at all. For there are critiques of notions 
of being, and of becoming woman, of concepts of the subject and of identity, 
and of concepts of gender as non-binary, which appear to preclude commit-
ments to feminist theory and critique. This is where Gayatri Spivak’s concept 
of a strategic essentialism might come in: adopting a theoretical stance for the 
purposes of political solidarity, a limited conception of subject positions may 
thus be taken to provide a basis for forming alliances, and taking up forms of 
7 Gillian Howie, Between Feminism and Materialism: A Question of Method, London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010, p. xi.
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political activism.8 The range of reference in both of Howie’s monographs is vast, 
and what follows must of necessity be selective and schematic in its account of 
her discussions. It is the fate of philosophical feminists to read both the women 
and the men, both inside and outside the discipline, whereas those with a less 
hospitable notion of the scope of the discipline have shorter reading lists. The 
following discussion falls into two sections: first, reading Adorno taking some 
instruction from Irigaray; and, second, reading Irigaray taking some instruction 
from Adorno, and they are designed to bring out the trajectory and distinctive 
tone of Howie’s thinking.
Reading Adorno with Irigaray
As remarked, it is only towards the end of the first book, on Deleuze and Spinoza, 
that Howie introduces a suggestion, which remains important for her second 
monograph: an affirmation of Adorno’s critique of ideological thinking. Objects 
of analysis adequate for giving an account of what there is are not available: the 
concepts are lacking, and these objects present themselves, if at all, only in distorted 
guise. This is the result both of the malign effects of historically dissociating 
contexts and, specifically, of processes associated with the commodity fetishism 
and a division of labour of late capitalism. Social relations appear as natural givens, 
and relations which should be thought as systems are taken as isolated parts, and 
subjected to cultural analysis rather than made part of a political critique. The 
forces and relations of late capitalist production restrict and distort processes of 
economic and cultural reproduction, imposing constraints on the stances and 
capacities available for those supposed to do the thinking. Thinking is obstructed 
and distorted by the noise and complicities generated in everyday transactions, 
and at best takes flight into relatively protected domains, shielded from the full 
force of a cultural appropriation. What appears valuable is made to appear so by 
interests concealed by the mechanics of a series of accommodations to what is.
Thus far, curiously, Adorno and his arch-enemy, Heidegger, find themselves in 
agreement. For Adorno, in his Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life,9 
8 In an interview ‘Criticism, Feminism and the Institution’ with Elizabeth Grosz from 1984, Spivak 
and Grosz rehearse the theoretical considerations which give rise to this notion of ‘strategic 
essentialism’, widely attribute to Spivak, but which Spivak herself has disputed. ‘I think we have to 
choose again strategically, not universal discourse, but essentialist discourse’ (p. 11), from Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues, ed. Sarah Harasym, 
London: Routledge, 1990.
9 See T. W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott, London: 
New Left Books, 1974.
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regrets the passing of an overview from which what there is might be viewed in 
its entirety. Heidegger, by contrast, develops a critique of the total mobilization 
of cultural forces under Nazism, while remaining a supporter of the regime and 
the party until its demise in 1945. According to Heidegger’s analysis, technology 
is not a question of technicity, politics is not a question of political forces: both 
must be relocated in terms of a far-reaching return to a founding philosophical 
question, why is there meaning rather than nothingness; and how has human 
inhabitation of the world resulted rather in a deepening nihilism rather than in 
a deepening sense for meaning and being?10 Adorno has biting critiques of the 
abstract nature of Heidegger’s language and concepts of history and technology 
in Jargon of Authenticity (1964) and Negative Dialectics (1966), but they share an 
analysis of a break in any supposed continuous history, with Adorno attempting 
to construct a connection back to a time before Nazism, and Heidegger vainly 
trying to peer into a future, after a completion of nihilism. They are marooned 
in a between time of history, for which Howie seeks remedy.
In the concluding pages of the Deleuze and Spinoza book, Howie writes of 
the constraints on thinking imposed by the material and social conditions of 
thought, as obstructing or at least delaying the formation, or stabilization of 
conditions for forming judgements about what there is; and for what there is 
to arrive in stable, identifiable form.11 When ‘all that is solid melts into air’, it is 
all the more difficult to establish an order of priorities and a logical sequence of 
thought. She continues the thought a few pages later, providing context for the 
previously given citation:
A break with idealism from the system of Hegel as well as Deleuze occurs when 
we pass to the object’s preponderance and thereby to a material critique of the 
nature of the universal. The task of criticising ideology, Adorno maintains, is to 
judge the subjective and objective moments and their dynamics. This returns 
to thought its three moments, the thought or judgement, the intentional object 
and the materiality of the object, as well as returning to substance its content.12
The driving force here is, implicitly, the materiality of the object, or of the objec-
tively given material conditions, however they may be socially manufactured, 
reproduced and re-enforced. The conception of substance is here inflected by 
the supposition that it acquires content by virtue of its modes of materialization, 
10 This analysis begins in Being and Time (1927) and is continued in Of the Event: Contributions to 
Philosophy (1936–44), first published in 1989, and in the ’Letter on Humanism’, written in 1946 and 
published in 1950, and the essay ‘The Question of Technology’ (1954).
11 Howie, Deleuze and Spinoza, p. 191.
12 Ibid., p. 205.
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which may be rendered incomplete, or partially obscured because of conflict 
with dominant accounts of the processes in question.
Theory is here construed as a practice conducted not by isolated individuals, 
but in groups of socially and culturally enabled people, whose modes of access 
to and ease of functioning within the forces and relations of cultural production 
are highly differentiated and charged up by inherited privileges and acquired 
disenfranchisements of all kinds. In this context, to acquire the status of a 
‘subject’ is, like that of citizenship, a long and hazardous process consisting 
in a combination of good and bad luck, good and bad health, self-formation, 
and a sometimes distinctly uncomfortable set of conformisms and assimila-
tions. The struggle to emerge out of these conditions is under interrogation in 
Adorno’s most Nietzschean book, Minima Moralia. Not least among the lines 
of conflict between Adorno and Heidegger is a struggle for the inheritance of 
the thought of Nietzsche. Adorno emphasizes the elements of cultural critique 
and a multiplication of modes of Germanness (Luther and Hölderlin, Bismarck 
and Benjamin). For Heidegger, what comes to the fore are the analyses of the 
devaluation of all values in the decline, marked up by a supposed European 
tendency to nihilism. The effects of social uprooting and disenfranchisement, 
as experienced by Adorno, when moving first from Germany to England, and 
then to the US, are both under analysis and made plain to see in that notion of 
a damaged life.
There are two surprises in Howie’s account. Deleuze and Deleuze’s Spinoza 
are more usually understood to break with the various idealisms of their day, 
with Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism proposed as a radical corrective to 
the idealistic versions of transcendentalism advanced in the names variously of 
Kant and of Husserl; and Spinoza is usually understood as the thinker of nature 
par excellence. For Howie, Deleuze is still locked into a mystificatory account 
of a univocity of being, affirming a metaphysical tradition which Howie reads 
as antipathetical to the production of a conceptuality adequate for an analysis 
of a current conjuncture. Deleuze himself does not of course endorse a materi-
alism, rather preferring the term ‘vitalism’, but his writings have been deployed 
in support of a new thinking of matter, sometimes phrased as a commitment 
to a materiality without matter, and he certainly puts in question commitments 
to nineteenth-century notions of matter, as defined by permanence and conti-
nuity. Against this reading, Howie ingeniously argues that for both Spinoza and 
Deleuze, there is still a role for a creator, or divine originator which guarantees 
what otherwise may remain in doubt: the unity and thinkability of what there 
is. While Howie is committed to such a thought of unity and thinkability, hence 
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the importance to her of a reading of Deleuze and of Spinoza, she supposes 
their arguments and demonstrations to be insufficient. Howie supposes that, for 
all his attention to new modes of materialization, for Deleuze, as for Spinoza, 
the univocity of being is a metaphysical commitment, not a materially demon-
strable truth. Thus, Howie mobilizes a notion of materialism against Deleuze, 
and against that form of feminist critique, sometimes called the Australian 
tendency, which has adopted a Deleuzian version of a double affirmation, as 
a move to unite ethical and metaphysical imperatives: yes to life, and yes to a 
necessary role for that affirmation in putting life in some kind of order, such that 
it might be thought. For Howie, this is yet another version of the Munchhausen 
attempt to extract oneself from the swamp of indeterminacy by one’s own 
pigtail, as critiqued by Nietzsche.13
In the second book, Between Feminism and Materialism, the implications 
of such an appeal to ideology critique and, more specifically, to the resources 
provided by Adorno’s inquiries lead to a proposal to reinvent dialectical materi-
alism. She states in the Acknowledgements, which is headed by the citation 
from Virginia Woolf, given above:
I also write to show that something politically relevant follows from the way we 
think about the relationship between subjects, objects, and their mediation.14
This of course is an echo of the remark in Virginia’s Woolf ’s To the Lighthouse, in 
which philosophical research is described, I suggest satirically, in the following 
terms:
Whenever she ‘thought of his work’ she always saw clearly before her a large 
kitchen table. It was Andrew’s doing. She asked him what his father’s books were 
about. ‘Subject and object and the nature of reality’, Andrew had said, and when 
she said Heavens, she had no notion what that meant. ‘Think of a kitchen table 
then’, he told her, ‘when you’re not there.’
The alteration is significant with the plurals, subjects and objects, and the 
substitution of the notion of mediation for that of an objectively given ‘nature 
13 The reference is to Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: ‘On the Prejudices of the Philosophers’, Section 
21 (trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990, p. 51), where he analyses the dangers 
of deriving philosophical concepts from the terms and concepts made available by the mechanics 
of the day. It would of course be necessary to interrogate the use made by Nietzsche of the image 
at the start of that text: ‘Supposing truth to be a woman – what? Is the suspicion not well founded 
that philosophers, when they have been dogmatists, have had little understanding of women’. The 
marvellous, but clearly false, implication of this remark is that women philosophers either do not 
understand women or are not dogmatists. Nietzsche’s commitment is more likely existential: to the 
view that women are not philosophers, one which Howie, of course, sees it is necessary to dispute.
14 Howie, Between Feminism and Materialism, p. xi.
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of reality’.15 For Woolf ’s imagined philosopher, reality is one and indivisible, 
whereas for Woolf and Howie, Adorno and Marx, it is essentially contested. 
Howie writes, on the third page of her introduction:
If the problem before us is the relationship between ‘the subject’, however 
construed, and ‘the object’, however construed, then I suggest we should 
regroup around the idea of dialectical materialism.16
In that book she thus develops an account of a version of dialectical materi-
alism, affirming a role for negation, and for a concept of negativity, which, 
for example, the analyses of Rosi Braidotti put into dispute in her critique of 
the version of them proposed and endlessly performed by Slavoj Žižek. The 
negation opposed by Braidotti, however, is not the negativity affirmed by 
Howie. For Howie, and indeed for Adorno, negativity provides a potency for 
disengaging from a dominant, disempowering discursivity, enabling the taking 
up of a stance elsewhere, in critical awareness of the limitations imposed by 
any domestication within an existing order. For Adorno, this negativity is to 
be thought in opposition both to conceptions of positivity, which for him have 
always been appropriated by the twin forces of the positivisms of nineteenth-
century science and liberal democracy, and to actually existing socialism, in 
which citizen spies on citizen, analyses proposed respectively by Karl Popper, 
and by the apologists for Stalin.17 These kinds of positivity, for both Adorno 
and Howie, form the greatest single barrier to critical emancipatory thinking 
and action, and, for them, any philosophy worthy of the name must start with 
a critique of them.
In a later section, in which she analyses concepts of identity, Howie adds 
some helpful footnotes on Adorno, and on this commitment to dialectics, 
15 Howie is by implication sympathetic to the Nietzschean regret, as expressed in Twilight of the Idols 
Section 5: ‘Reason’, Philosophy (trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968, p. 38): 
‘Nothing, in fact, has hitherto had a more direct power of persuasion than the error of being as it 
was formulated by, for example the Eleatics: for every word, every sentence we utter speaks in its 
favour! – Even the opponents of the Eleatics were still subject to the seductive influence of their 
concept of being: Democritus, among others, when he invented his atom. “Reason” in language: 
oh what a deceitful old woman! I fear we are not dispensing with God, while we still believe in 
grammar.’ She would of course question why ‘reason’ is figured as an old woman, in a pejorative 
sense. There would, however, be room here for an affirmative reclamation. As Adorno remarks: 
‘No-one, who writes in German and who knows how much his thoughts are saturated with the 
German language, should forget Nietzsche’s critique of this sphere.’ In ‘On the question “what 
is German?”’, from Stichworten, trans. Henry W. Pickford in Critical Models: Interventions and 
Catchwords, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 213.
16 Howie, Between Feminism and Materialism, p. 3.
17 For details of this in relation to sociology, see The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology with 
contributions from Adorno, Albert, Dahrendorf et al., ed. and trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby, 
London: Heinemann, 1976).
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providing a clue to the trajectory of her thinking. She writes in one footnote of 
the relation back to the previous book on Deleuze and Spinoza:
Adorno continues by writing that positivity runs counter to thought and that it 
takes friendly persuasion by social authority to accustom thought to positivity. 
This idea was the impetus behind my Deleuze and Spinoza book.18
This notion of ‘friendly persuasion by social authority’ has strong resonances 
with Gyorgy Lukács’ notion of ‘imposed reconciliation’, and, for Howie, Lukács 
is another twentieth-century Marxist thinker important for her notion of 
developing philosophy as political critique. Relevant here are Lukacs’ notions of 
reification, and his analyses of the amphibolies of attributing human agency to 
commodities, and to the technical relations through which they are produced, 
while rendering human beings inert functionaries within these processes. These 
concerns come to attention in this second book, in which Howie explicitly 
invokes History and Class Consciousness, and remarks on Juliet Mitchell’s inter-
vention, in 1971 in a proposal for a transformed Marxism, as follows,
That said, as early as 1971, Juliet Mitchell made an incontrovertible case against 
traditional Marxism: it would have to be a transformed Marxism. A workable 
account of women’s oppression could not merely attach concepts of oppression 
to traditional Marxist theories.19
 In another footnote, to the section on questions of identity, human and 
metaphysical, she marks a possible future development for a dialectical concep-
tuality, one which she takes up in her subsequent thinking of the disenablements, 
disempowerments and disenfranchisements specific to disabilities of various 
kinds, and attaching specifically to mortal illnesses. This conceptuality may 
provide resources for a preparation for death in life:
In this way dialectics could help to make sense of the self as a composite site and 
host for various life-forms or help find content for claims to intersectionality.20
She indicates how Adorno’s thinking provides a selective version of a Nietzschean 
affirmation of life: and she is not going to allow life, and indeed the reading of 
Nietzsche, to be simply handed over to the vitalists and new materialists.21 Her 
18 Howie, Between Feminism and Materialism, pp. 232–3, fn. 51.
19 Ibid., p. 28.
20 Ibid., p. 232, fn. 39.
21 Here attention is due to Nietzsche’s observation in Gay Science, Book III, Section 109: ‘Let us beware 
saying that death is opposed to life: the living is merely a species of the dead, and a very rare species 
at that’, which might be read as a critique of Hegelian dialectical construals of life and death. He goes 
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discussion thus develops an account of concept formation informed by, but 
not continuous with, Adorno’s analyses of how conceptions of a subject and an 
object are not as readily available as grammar might suggest.
Howie affirms a return to some version of a dialectical materialism within 
a certain history of philosophy, with a three-part account of materialism: 
reductionist, realist and dialectical. The first is shown to be hampered by a 
denial of the distinctiveness of conscious activity; and the second disenabled 
by the strangeness of what is to be encountered as states of affairs in the world. 
Dialectical materialism has for Howie the virtue of revealing how what there 
is in the world is in part produced by human activity, which is then denied by 
groups of human agents, seeking to evade responsibility for making it that way. 
Gaining access to what there is is part of the problem to be thought through, 
and Howie makes use of Hannah Arendt’s distinctions between labour, work 
and action to mark up important differences between labouring within a given 
order, work to produce specific items within that given order and action to 
transform it. Howie writes:
First, drawing some inspiration from Arendt, we can designate three human 
activities: work, labor, an daction. … To labor and to work, to produce 
independent objects for exchange, are historically and conceptually distinct 
and, although the distinction is masked, it reappears in Marx’s categories of 
productive and unproductive labor.22
Thus, for example, primogeniture, patriarchy and Protestantism can be shown 
to be human artefacts, within a given order, confirmed in place by human 
action, not given as part of a natural order of things. However, they may be 
treated as the result of work and not of action, and thus responsibility for their 
maintenance and discriminatory effects may be denied.
In conclusion to her section on identity, she reveals that she is also proposing 
a reinvention of a radical feminism, revived by but not handed over to some of 
Irigaray’s analyses. She invokes a triangulation of aims in theory informed by 
Marxist critique: a focus on the historical operations and processes of capitalist 
development; a deployment of a logic of contradiction to capture the conflictual 
and contestatory nature of relations in the world, as formed by capital; and a 
mode of political activism, designed to reveal and moderate the exploitative 
aspects of those two first features. She then remarks:
on to say: ‘Let us beware thinking that the world eternally creates newness. There are no eternally 
enduring substances; matter is just such an error, like the God of the Eleatics.’
22 Howie, Between Feminism and Materialism, p. 27.
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It has been my contention in this chapter that if we can see feminism as a similar 
triangulation, a reinvigorated notion of dialectical materialism will help us to 
grasp the dynamics of the historical processes of capitalism and this will, in 
turn, be informed by, and support a radical feminist politics.23
The grand surprise, then, is the way in which Howie thus supplements and 
subverts Adorno’s known insensitivity to the claims of gender and race by this 
complex endorsement of a radical feminism informed by a reception of Marx 
and by Irigaray’s disputes with Lacanian orthodoxy.
Reading Irigaray with Adorno
In Speculum of the Other Woman, Irigaray challenges the rewriting of psychoa-
nalysis by Jacques Lacan, which deepens the subordination in Freud’s thinking 
of female desire and identity formation to the requirements of a logic of male 
desire and identity formation.24 Irigaray appeals to a critique of a certain Engels 
in The Origin of the Family, of Private Property and the State (1884) of a naturali-
zation of family relations in which human labour is laid open to exploitation. 
The implication is that Freudian and Lacanian theory serves to support the 
disenfranchisement of women with respect to these processes of appropriation. 
Those kinds of radical feminist critique which analysed the expropriation of 
value from women in the processes of human reproduction, and linked this 
to critiques of systems of enslavement worldwide, are not far away. Calling the 
child by the father’s name and handing down property only to male heirs are 
merely the surface effects of a system of appropriation and control which finds 
its truth in the begetting of slave children on enslaved women, as enhance-
ments of property rights. It is not just minerals and raw materials which are 
expropriated world-wide in the name of free trade, but populations sold into 
servitude and children born into slavery. These wider connections to a process 
of global exploitation, the middle class status of Freud’s patients, and the relative 
privileges of those suffering from Lacanian and Žižekian angst, unfortunately 
drop out of view in Irigaray’s subsequent work, but for Howie they remain to 
the forefront.
23 Howie, Between Feminism and Materialism, p. 129.
24 See Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. Gillian C. Gill, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1985.
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Howie reads in an important supplement to Irigaray’s well-known obser-
vation, used as the title to a section of the pivotal insert in Irigaray’s: Speculum:
Any theory of the subject is always appropriated to the masculine.25
The transposed version of Irigaray’s claim focuses on the parallel Marxist claim: 
‘any theory of the object has always been appropriated to market value’. Howie 
comments:
In the previous chapter we saw that the plane of feminist theory already includes 
models of complex and variegated social, political, and economic mechanisms 
that create hierarchies and asymmetries as well as the differential distributions 
of primary goods. With this in mind, I suggest starting with, and then departing 
from Irigaray’s notion of the symbolic: a modified if not entirely new line of 
flight.26
It might here be necessary to modify this appropriation of the language of 
Deleuze and Guattari, and insert a series of plurals, lines of flight and planes 
of immanence, as construed in the name of a feminist thinking. Certainly, 
there are a number of planes in Irigaray’s writings, but no direct contact to 
the Deleuzo–Guattarian notions of planes of immanence and lines of flight. 
In Speculum Irigaray opens her discussion, ‘A blind spot in an old dream of 
symmetry’, by citing Freud’s famous observation concerning femininity in the 
New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis,
The problem of femininity preoccupies you, if you are men. For the women, 
who find themselves among you, the question does not pose itself, since you are 
yourselves the enigma of which we talk.27
 In Strachey’s translation this is smoothed over, making less obvious the 
contrast between ‘we men’, who make up the group, talking amongst themselves, 
and ‘you, the curious interloper’.28 Reading Woolf makes for a greater sensitivity 
to the importance of such apparently minor shifts of register. This figure works 
for Irigaray, in this study, as an emblem for the manner in which from Plato to 
Hegel, from Socrates to Lacan, and beyond, men have talked and, from time to 
time, women have been talked about, as partially present, arriving somehow on 
the edge of the matter in hand, for brief consideration and attention. Here, the 
25 Irigaray, Speculum, p. 165.
26 Howie, Between Feminism and Materialism, p. 58.
27 Quoted in Irigaray, Speculum, p. 9.
28 Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Penguin Freud Library Vol. 2, trans. 
James Strachey, Harmondsworth: Penguin 1973, p. 146.
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power of a dominant hegemonic discourse posits the male as the norm, and the 
female as the exceptional aberrant case: in Hegel’s words, the eternal irony of the 
tribe.
Summing up her discussion in that first section of her book of the blatant 
and more subtle expressions of sexism in Freudian theory, Irigaray draws on a 
Marxist account of value and of exploitation posing the well put question: ‘what 
kind of economic infrastructure demands the conception of women provided 
by Freud?’29 She goes on to quote Friedrich Engels’ observation from the Origin 
of the Family, of Private Property and of the State:
The first antagonism based on class which arrives in history coincides with 
the antagonism between men and women in monogamy and the first class 
oppression that of the female sex by the male sex.
Thus, Irigaray herself has motivated the thought that a critique of Freudian 
masculinism can go by way of an elaboration of Marxist theory. Her study 
of the derogation and exclusion of women in the history of philosophy, and 
in the practices of psychoanalysis, suggests how these practices replicate and 
reproduce the practices of an exclusion, transmitted through the two-thousand 
year history and practice of philosophy. These practices are, still in evidence 
in an inherited conceptuality, in which differential entitlements remain to 
this day a difficult topic to locate and address. The surface effect is the 
derogation of women and of femininity in psychoanalytical theory; the source 
of such derogation is the actual functioning of social and political relations 
of production and reproduction. Critique of these exclusions forms part of a 
more general critique of ideology, and it is thus something of a surprise, and 
indeed disappointment, when Irigaray subsequently renaturalizes a distinction 
between the female and the male, which Engels and Marx have thus put in 
focus as precisely historically produced in specific exploitative contexts, and as 
precisely not an organically, universally natural given. Thus any affirmation of 
Irigaray’s insights requires a careful modulation through the questions posed to 
Eurocentric, and heterosexist, as well as to masculinist prejudice and distortion.
Howie thus works through her encounter with Irigaray, protected by her 
Marxist account of the various disenfranchisements of human beings, at 
various stages of their development, and the resulting exclusions from cultural 
production. Howie is sensitive to the radical feminist view that differences 
in relation to roles and tasks in reproduction are so great as to give credence 
29 Irigaray, Speculum, p. 150.
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to this notion, proposed by Irigaray, but not unquestioningly accepted by 
Howie, that sexual difference is the issue of our epoch. This claim arrives in the 
opening declaration of Irigaray’s The Ethics of Sexual Difference, where Irigaray 
inserts her discussion of an exclusion of women and a repression of femininity 
within philosophy and psychoanalysis into her reception of Martin Heidegger’s 
account of a series of epochs in the history of metaphysics. The inheritance 
from Adorno of rational critique, as critical immanentism, thus undergoes a 
startling transformation in Howie’s hands, when she conjoins Adorno’s critique 
to this reception of Irigaray’s appropriation of the ontology of the arch-enemy, 
Heidegger, and of his thought concerning a word for being, which determines 
the fate of an epoch:
Each epoch, according to Heidegger, has one matter to think. Only one. Sexual 
difference is probably that of our time. The matter of our time which, once 
thought, will provide ‘salut’: rescue, health, welcome.30
The citation modifies Heidegger’s claim, since the French ‘salut’ goes well 
beyond the ambiguity of Heidegger’s own phrase, concerning the need for a 
rescue, Rettung, in a time of need.
Adorno identifies as key the duplicity of Heidegger’s commitment to ontology, 
and to a conception of being, as empty signifier, permitting both persecutory 
and emancipatory investment. Adorno therefore declines to engage in such 
ontological speculation, preferring the registers of Kantian antinomy and of a 
Hegelian speculative proposition, left open-ended by a failure of the moment 
of its actualization in history. Howie, in her discussion of identity, thus invokes 
Adorno’s arguments in Negative Dialectics (1966) to propose a rethinking of 
identity, in all its registers, through an affirmation of concepts of speculative 
identity, articulated as three distinct counterpoised registers of being, not as 
a single unified monolithic set of processes of approaching and withdrawal. 
In her discussion of ‘Identity and Non-identity’,31 Howie emphasizes differ-
ences between the ‘is’ of formal identity (an apple is an apple); the ‘is’ of a 
judgement with ontological commitment (here is an apple); and the evaluative 
‘is’: this is a health-giving apple. Matters get lively when this is transposed onto 
the social and historical sphere. The apparently tautological claim, ‘a people 
is a people’, should be contested, since the compositions of populations are 
historical accidents not historical necessities; the claim ‘here is a people’ must 
be approached with caution, since it is likely to have been appropriated by some 
30 Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, p. 13.
31 Howie, Between Feminism and Materialism, p. 115.
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self-absorbed leader, or racially motivated clique, seeking to promote their own 
cause, preservation, promotion or conatus. The next step is the politically lazy 
and dangerous claim: this people embodies a world historical destiny, to which 
other peoples must give way.
Adorno in his Jargon of Authenticity does not focus on the oddity of 
Heidegger’s notion of history, which fails to address the specific conditions of 
historical processes in Germany in the 1930s and 1940s. Adorno there is intent 
on a more general critique of the insistence on ontology, and its claim to provide 
a critique of the inadequate commitments of everyday, taken-for-granted 
identities, while actually still holding on to them. For Heidegger, ‘Germany’ is 
some mythical entity, flowing from the mouth of the Danube in the Black Sea 
back into a heartland constituted by the Black Forest, through which a Roman 
inheritance is transformed back into an affirmation of autochthonous existing. 
The loss of foundations [Bodenlosigkeit] of metaphysical enquiry is to be 
restored by an affirmation of an ethnically specific grounding [Bodenständigkeit] 
in a locality. In Negative Dialectics, the inadequacies of Heidegger’s account of 
history is in focus, drawing on the critique of Karl Löwith, and Heidegger’s 
history can be shown to be not the critical history of Nietzschean invention, nor 
yet the antiquarian history in which Nietzsche allows for an insight into how 
the present differs from the past, and different pasts differ from each other. This 
is monumental history, claiming supremacy and exclusive access to both past 
and future, thus blocking all routes to growth, transformation, differentiation.
Howie thus follows Adorno’s lead, but she does so under the guidance 
of Irigaray’s insight that in this modern epoch what is to be thought are the 
differences between human beings, both within and between epochs. Irigaray’s 
mobilization of the Heideggerian word for being may thus be informed, indeed 
enveloped by Irigaray’s attention to a Spinozan counter-discourse, for a critique 
of the use of a concept of a neutral ‘man’ in accounts of undifferentiated human 
rights. In her discussion of Spinoza, Irigaray makes the following remark:
That ‘man’ wishes to be both man and woman is not news: the attempt always 
to return to an enveloping, to an interiority. But, in this willing to master every-
thing, the master becomes the slave both of discourse and of a ‘mother nature’.32 
Howie borrows from these movements of a return to Spinoza, and from Irigaray’s 
immanent critique of a conception of a threatening ‘mother-nature’, while 
distancing herself from the restrictions consequent on both the Deleuzian and the 
32 Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, p. 94.
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Irigarayan re-deployments of ontology. Howie proposes a retrieval of ontology, 
within the terms of the logic of suspicion, as inscribed by Adorno under the 
rubric ‘the jargon of authenticity’; and this retrieval is inflected by her proposed 
modification of Irigaray’s word for being in this new epoch. The word is still 
‘sexual difference’, but now no longer focused on sexuate being, and a givenness 
of two mutually delimiting essences, but on a sexual difference, conceived as 
generative of differential, multiple, intersectional identities, in accordance with 
a Spinozan logic of multiple affective potentialities. These affective potentialities 
are to be accessed by affirming rather than seeking to transcend the positionality 
of thinking, as variously and transformatively embodied: between the various 
births and rebirths, and between imaginary, symbolic and actual deaths, to which 
human nature, as first and as second nature, is prone.
In her last five years, Howie was exposed with a new urgency to the impera-
tives of thematizing this, without traducing the impact of the various forms 
of physical infirmity, and of all the indignities of medicalization to which 
human beings are susceptible. This gave her a new appreciation for the work 
of Foucault on the Birth of the Clinic, and for Deleuze on the workings of 
principles of originary difference, and differentiation. The model for philo-
sophical method remains one of subjective thought, material conditions, and 
the mediations provided by the concept, but there is here also in play a series 
of supplementations, whereby the masculinism of Adorno’s thinking, however 
pessimistic and piecemeal, is moderated by the insistence on a radical feminism, 
and on the thinking of Irigaray, on the difference it makes to be female, and 
the experience of an exclusion which has its origin somewhere other than its 
immediately expressed forms . Thereby the implicit and not so implicit hetero-
normativity of Irigaray’s views may also be moderated by inserting them into 
real-world contexts of lived differences, and the failures of abstract identifica-
tions to provide people with the means to access an understanding of their own 
conditions. It becomes possible to analyse how naively accepted or maliciously 
imposed notions of naturally given gender distinctions ensnare all human 
beings, but cut down with differential force and differential degrees of damage, 
with respect to empowerments and disempowerments, to gender dysmorphia 
and intersex conditions of all kinds. From medical interventions to impose 
gender distinctiveness on intersexed bodies, to cultural normalizations of who 
may claim to be respectively female or male, the politics of embodied differ-
ences have never been more pressing.
In her study, Luce Irigaray and the Philosophy of Sexual Difference, cited by 
Howie, Alison Stone puts the point with customary incisiveness:
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Intersexed bodies refute Irigaray’s claims that all individuals are naturally either 
male or female: ‘The whole human kind (genre humain) is composed of women 
and men and it is composed of nothing else.’33
Following that up with:
The most compelling conclusion from intersex, then, is that it implies that there 
is no natural sex difference at all. This challenges Irigaray more radically, not 
merely affirming more natural sexes than she countenances, but holding her 
entire belief in natural duality to be misguided.34
Howie sets up a context for analysis in which Irigaray’s dogmatism may be 
corrected by appeal to a speculative logic derived from Adorno; and Adorno’s 
limited vision may be corrected by Irigaray’s account of such blind spots, and 
by her attention to the silent force of an accumulating historical derogation 
of women. Irigaray’s analyses may thus be exposed as succumbing to the 
temptation to take for natural what is only a feature of class interest, dividing 
up against each other the various sources of resistance to oligarchical appro-
priations of power and property. For Irigaray’s gesture of naturalizing sexual 
difference, and rendering it a matter of ‘to be two’ reifies the very structure 
which she supposes herself to be putting in question. Instead of examining 
a mediatized and medicalized preoccupation with sexual difference, as 
a relation between two sexes, and then revealing such preoccupation as 
providing access to a disruption of such a mechanical, outdated conception, 
Irigaray oddly re-imposes a dogmatic account of an immobilized bipolarity. 
What Howie takes away from her encounter with Irigaray is a sensitivity to 
how – if, as a condition of entry into discussion, some irreducible aspect, 
necessary to one’s own existence may have to be disavowed – there will 
be crucially disenabling effects on any capacity to participate effectively. 
The arrival of Adorno on the scene suggests that in some way or other all 
individual human beings are excluded by the criteria of entry into philo-
sophical analysis, simply because the idealized subject addressed by regimes 
of meaning formation is simply that: idealized. At this point, the master who 
refused Irigaray her licence to practice, Jacques Lacan, also arrives on the 
scene, with his analysis of how the master’s discourse is no discourse, for the 
master has nothing to prove, and it is only the one who aspires to mastery, 
33 Alison Stone, Luce Irigaray and the Philosophy of Sexual Difference, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006, p. 114. Stone is quoting Luce Irigaray, I Love to You: Sketch for a Possible 
Felicity in History, trans. Alison Martin, London: Routledge, 1996, p. 84.
34 Stone, Irigaray, p. 115.
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who engages in the contradictory task of trying to demonstrate mastery, 
which must always lie out of reach.35
Conclusion
In these two monographs, a hybrid theorization is in process, with a crossflow 
of enquiry and conceptuality between three significant if unlikely sets of 
resources, within which Howie’s thinking is to be situated: the writings of 
Adorno, the thinking of sexual difference proposed by Luce Irigaray, and a 
politics of a minoritarian resistance, released from the constraining artifice of 
anti-Oedipalism, and from the restricting ontology of a body without organs, 
to which the Deleuzo–Guattarian reception is prone. For even anti-Oedipalism 
is still by derivation oedipal, and fails to reveal the full force of the exclusions, 
whereby those marked as other, and, amongst them, women can never enter into 
a symbolic order whether governed by Oedipal or by anti-Oedipal conceptual 
regimes. In contrast to a notion of ‘Maxima Moralia’, implying a universal status 
for moral maxims, Adorno adopts the phrase Minima Moralia, moral thinking 
in a minor key, recognizing the unavailability of universalizing, teleological 
fulfilments as charted by Kant and Marx, in terms of a categorical imperative 
and a worldwide revolution. When he encounters non-thematizable horror, he 
abandons macro-analysis in favour of micro-logical interrogations of cultural 
formations, constructed through prismatic refraction, in the modes of Eingriffe 
(1963) and Stichworten (1969), translated as ‘Interventions’ and ‘Catchwords’. In 
her second book, Howie begins to adopt and adapt something like that serial, 
paratactic mode of construction of analysis and argument, whereby the whole 
may be intimated, even while it remains beyond the compass of an available 
conceptuality. She risks the unlikely conjunctures of Adorno’s negative dialectics 
with radical feminism, of Irigaray’s thinking with an emancipatory programme, 
affirming hybrid resources for a new conceptuality. For Adorno, and for Howie, 
philosophy continues in an afterlife scarred by its encounters with various 
totalizations, and totalitarianisms, and their attendant harms and destructions. 
Howie accepts the diagnosis of a drastically changed milieu for philosophizing, 
with rationality, as closed system, no longer a viable model of philosophical 
35 See Jacques Lacan, ‘The Production of the Four Discourses’, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, The 
Seminars of Jacques Lacan Book XVII (1969–70), trans. Russell Grigg, New York: Norton, 2007.
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practice; but she also affirms the non-negotiable inheritance of the ideals of 
rational enquiry.
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